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Safeguarding Hospitality
Service When the
Unexpected Happens
Lessons Learned from the Blackout of ’03
by ROBERT J. KWORTNIK
The blackout of ’03 took many hoteliers in the north-
eastern United States and Canada largely by surprise.
Hotel managers found themselves scrambling to
serve guests overnight in darkened hotels, many of
which did not have running water, let alone expected
amenities. Despite the challenges, hoteliers respond-
ing to a postblackout survey reported that their staff
members were up to the task of providing hospitality
for guests—often by devising creative processes for
check-in and checkout, food service, and the like. For
their part, guests were mostly understanding about
the power failure and appreciated hotel employees’
efforts on their behalf. However, guests were sur-
prised that hotels often did not have backup power to
maintain critical systems after emergency power
failed. Service quality and the guest experience typi-
cally suffered at those hotels that lost power and were
ill prepared to deal with disruptions in the service sys-
tem. This article examines these problems and pro-
vides insights for how to safeguard service when the
unexpected happens.
Keywords: disaster planning; blackout of 2003
The hospitality industry has faced considerablerecent adversity due to human and natural forcesthat have disrupted vital inputs to the service-
delivery system, notably, electrical power. In the late
summer of 2004, thousands of hospitality providers in
the southern United States were without power for
days after hurricanes Charley, Frances, Ivan, and
Jeanne burst ashore. A year earlier, Hurricane Isabel
interrupted power along the mid-Atlantic coast for a
week or more.1 Although wide power outages were not
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recorded in the winter of 2003-04, ice
storms have knocked power out in the
past.2 There is also the rising incidence of
man-made threats to the power system,
from mismanagement of electricity sup-
ply and demand, as illustrated by the Cali-
fornia energy crisis in 2001 that led to roll-
ing blackouts, to terrorism, as vividly and
tragically exposed by the events of Sep-
tember 11, 2001.3
This study focuses on an event that,
though fortunately not tragic, was still un-
settling in its suddenness and scope: the
blackout of August 14, 2003. The largest
power failure in North American history
left some 50 million electricity customers
across the northeastern United States and
southern Canada without power for as
long as two days. Despite a better under-
standing of the causes of the blackout of
’03 and improvements in coordination
across the power transmission system,
energy researchers and industry leaders
have concluded that the power grid
remains vulnerable and that reliability is
not certain.4 Although some viewed the
blackout as an isolated event, the fre-
quency of power loss due to other forces
suggests that hospitality managers should
reconsider their risk perceptions and abil-
ity to tolerate sudden and sometimes
extended losses of inputs such as electri-
cal power that are critical to the hotel
operation.
This study is an effort to develop a
better picture of what happened during
the blackout and what its impact was on
hotels’ service quality and the guest expe-
rience. More broadly, this study speaks to
the need and ability of companies in the
hospitality industry to prepare and deal
with significant disasters or disruptions in
the basic elements required to provide ser-
vice (e.g., electricity, gas, water). Analy-
ses of responses from nearly 150 hotel
managers suggest that the hospitality in-
dustry coped with the blackout, but not
always well. Though lodging was almost
always provided to guests and even to
nonguests, a lack of basic amenities—
from emergency lighting to functioning
toilets—was all too common, especially
as the duration of the power outage ex-
tended beyond a few hours. Despite the
efforts of hotel personnel to recover from
service failures, overall service quality
was compromised by shortcomings in the
physical dimension of the hotel service
offering and associated processes. Many
facilities failures could have been miti-
gated, if not avoided entirely, with better
planning. The result would be a significant
improvement in service reliability and
assurance—key dimensions of service
excellence expected all the more by trav-
elers in a post-9/11 world.
In the next section of this article, I
briefly review research on service quality
to provide a context for analyzing hotel
performance on this key construct. I then
introduce the methods used to examine
what happened to hotel service during the
blackout. Subsequent sections of the study
describe data analysis and findings across
four main areas: (1) effects of the blackout
on the service-delivery system, (2) contin-
gency planning before the blackout and
management action during the event, (3)
service recovery and guest satisfaction,
and (4) the impact of the blackout on the
bottom line. I close the article with discus-
sion, implications, and recommendations
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Hospitality companies continue to take for granted
the safety of their surroundings, the reliability of their
systems, and the ability of their employees to make
up the difference.
for hospitality managers for how to better
safeguard service when the unexpected
happens.
Conceptual Review:
Service Quality
Service quality is an ambiguous con-
struct, one that has only recently received
rigorous treatment by researchers.5 Devel-
opment of a clear picture of service quality
in the hospitality context is important to
more precisely identify the “whats” and
“hows” of service-quality improvement,
both in everyday and extraordinary con-
texts. In the review that follows, I outline
the main concepts that form a framework
for understanding service quality. This
discussion is augmented by research that
examines service quality and that sheds
light on the service quality issues of rele-
vance to the blackout of ’03.
Service versus
Customer Service
The distinction between service and
customer service is subtle, and the two
constructs are often confounded by cus-
tomers and managers alike. For example,
when a hotel manager states that a hotel
has “4-star service,” the aspect of the hotel
product this label evokes is the personal
service provided by staff. However, a ser-
vice represents the total experience a cus-
tomer receives from a service provider, of
which customer service is but one ele-
ment. For a hotel, everything the guest
experiences, from the physical evidence
(e.g., room decor) to the processes (e.g.,
check-in) to the performance of people
(e.g., a friendly greeting) constitutes the
service offered in fulfillment of the prom-
ise of a safe, comfortable, enjoyable stay.
The key point is that customer service is
only one aspect of the broader service
construct—a distinction that is particu-
larly important for the assessment of
service quality.
Service Quality
Researchers generally agree that ser-
vice quality is not a unidimensional con-
struct that simply reflects whether a firm’s
customer service is excellent or poor.6 In-
stead, service quality represents a com-
posite of factors that determine customers’
perceptions about the service offering. In a
seminal work on the topic, Parasuraman,
Zeithaml, and Berry conceptualized ser-
vice quality not as objectively measured
according to technical standards but in-
stead as subjectively perceived by custom-
ers and measured relative to customer-
determined standards.7 Thus, service qual-
ity was defined as the gap between per-
ceived service delivered by a firm and the
expected service that excellent that firms
should offer. This “user-based approach”
to studying service quality continues to
guide much research and is especially
appropriate for analyzing services due
to their intangible and heterogeneous
nature.
The Parasuraman, Zeithaml, and Berry
study suggested that customers perceive
service quality in terms of ten potentially
overlapping dimensions. Subsequent
analysis of the dimensions of service qual-
ity led to a five-factor model and accom-
panying scale, SERVQUAL, that has be-
come the gold standard of service-quality
measurement.8 Descriptions of the five
dimensions of service quality (known as
the “RATER” dimensions) are shown in
Exhibit 1. Research conducted in non-
hospitality contexts showed that reliabil-
ity is the most important factor in deter-
mining service-quality perceptions; the
dimensions of empathy and tangibles
tended to have the least influence, though
these factors remained important.9 This
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suggests that customers may assess the
quality of a service provider positively as
long as a reliable outcome is provided
(e.g., a fast-food order is fulfilled accu-
rately), even if performance on other
dimensions is lacking (e.g., service is un-
friendly). By the same logic, perceptions
of service quality are most likely to suffer
if the service outcome is not as promised
(e.g., the food order is wrong) regardless
of how the service is delivered (e.g., by a
smiling worker).
Service Quality in Hospitality
Research in the lodging industry has
revealed a distinctive pattern of factors
underlying guests’service-quality percep-
tions. For instance, a study of business
customers found that “conviviality” of
service (e.g., staff attitudes and attention
to guests) was the dominant factor. How-
ever, a combined reliability-tangibles fac-
tor also influenced service quality, which
suggested that customers considered these
two elements to be related.10 Thus, unclean
facilities (tangibles) would reflect a lack
of reliability. Research on older travelers’
service-quality perceptions produced a
similar finding: that is, reliability was one
of the more important factors, but items
intended to measure tangibles, specifi-
cally that hotel staff should be well
dressed and neat and that hotel facilities
should be visually appealing, loaded on
the reliability factor.11 Fick and Ritchie
likewise reported that reliability, assur-
ance, and tangibles (in that order) were the
most important to hotel service-quality
expectations, whereas tangibles, assur-
ance, and reliability (in that order) were
the most highly rated dimensions of per-
ceived service performance.12 In a study of
hotels in Korea, responsiveness (e.g.,
speed of check-in and checkout and
employee courtesy) and tangibles (e.g.,
guest room cleanliness, quietness, and
comfort) were the most important indica-
tors of service quality.13 In a study of hotels
in Greece, guests gave the highest mean
service-quality scores on the tangibles and
16 Cornell Hotel and Restaurant Administration Quarterly FEBRUARY 2005
DISASTER SAFEGUARDING HOSPITALITY SERVICE
Exhibit 1:
Service Quality Dimensions Identified by Parasuraman, Zeithaml, and Berry
(1988)
Dimension Description
Reliability Delivering the promised service dependably and accurately
(e.g., reserved hotel room is cleaned and ready by guest
check-in time).
Assurance Ability of employees to inspire trust and confidence through
their knowledge and courtesy (e.g., guests feel safe at the
hotel and staff has the knowledge to answer questions).
Tangibles Appearance of the service facilities, equipment, personnel,
and marketing communications (e.g., the hotel facility is
visually appealing and employees are appropriately
dressed).
Empathy Personalized attention and caring given to customers (e.g.,
hotel staff have the guests’ best interests at heart).
Responsiveness Willingness to help customers and provide prompt service
(e.g., staff are never too busy to respond to guest requests).
Source: A. Parasuraman, Valarie Zeithaml, and Leonard L. Berry, “SERVQUAL: A Multiple-Item Scale for
Measuring Consumer Perceptions of Service Quality,” Journal of Retailing 64 (Spring 1988): 12-40.
assurance dimensions.14 Finally, in a study
of business travelers in Norway, the tangi-
ble aspects of housekeeping and intangi-
ble aspects of reception were the key
explanatory variables for overall guest sat-
isfaction.15 In one of the few hotel-based
studies that did not find a strong effect
for tangibles on service quality, Knutson
and colleagues, using an adapted version
of SERVQUAL, which they dubbed
LODGSERV, reported that the order of
importance of the factors determining
hotel service quality across lodging sec-
tors was reliability, assurance, responsive-
ness, tangibles, and empathy.16
Conceptual Implications
Findings from these studies support
several key ideas. Most relevant to the
present study is that service quality is best
conceptualized as customer defined and
multidimensional. This means that hospi-
tality managers should attend not only to
customer service but also to other factors
that influence service quality, such as tan-
gibles and assurance. Though research in
nonhospitality contexts generally shows
that tangibles constitute the least impor-
tant service-quality dimension,17 the op-
posite is true in the lodging context. Ele-
ments of the tangibles and reliability
dimensions were confounded in some
studies, which suggests that lodging cus-
tomers perceive reliable service to depend
in part on the quality of tangible service
features. Also notable is that the “people”
factors of responsiveness and empathy
were generally the least important service-
quality dimensions. In none of the hotel
studies was empathy a main determinant
of service quality, though it did emerge as
having influence. This is not to say that
hospitality managers should ignore or
downplay emphasis on empathetic ser-
vice. However, it does suggest that relying
on customer service at the expense of
other factors is a misguided strategy for
improving guest perceptions of service
quality. It was this conceptual framework
for service quality that guided data col-
lection and analysis for this study.
Method
Starting with a database of 1,495 hotels
in the area affected by the blackout (i.e.,
Connecticut, Massachusetts, Michigan,
New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Pennsylva-
nia, Vermont, and the province of On-
tario),18 I derived a sample of 667 e-mail
contacts for hotels that were directly af-
fected by the blackout.19 Responses were
received from 93 hotel managers, for a
response rate of 13.9 percent.20 The largest
clusters of responses came from manag-
ers in Detroit (17), New York City (15),
and Toronto (10). The frequency of these
responses relative to the overall response
set is consistent with news reports about
areas that were most affected by the
blackout.
Exhibits 2, 3, and 4 provide additional
information about the hotels in this study.
Comparison of these characteristics with
the North American hotel population as
tabulated by Smith Travel Research (see
the first column of each table) reveals that
the sample overrepresents chain-affiliated
hotels at the upper end of the quality scale,
hotels in urban locations, and hotels with
more than seventy-five rooms. In consid-
eration of this overweighting, the findings
and conclusions presented in this study are
conservative and likely underestimate the
severity of the impact of the blackout. This
is because hotels that are
underrepresented here (e.g., small, high-
way, economy properties) tended to fare
worse during the blackout than did hotels
that are overrepresented.
Exploratory interviews with hotel man-
agers suggested that the impact of the
blackout and management’s response to it
FEBRUARY 2005 Cornell Hotel and Restaurant Administration Quarterly 17
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Exhibit 2:
Survey Responses Categorized by Hotel Scale and Chain Affiliation
Percentage Blackout Percentage
of Hotel Survey of Blackout
STR Scale and Chain Affiliation Census Responses Responses
Upper-upscale chain 3.5 17 18.3
Upscale chain 4.7 20 21.5
Midscale with F&B chain 9.7 12 12.9
Midscale without F&B chain 14.0 22 23.7
Economy chain 20.5 5 5.4
Independent 47.7 17 18.3
Total 100.0 93 100.0
Note: STR = Smith Travel Research; see note 18. F&B = food and beverage.
Exhibit 3:
Survey Responses Categorized by Hotel Location
Percentage Blackout Percentage
of Hotel Survey of Blackout
STR Location Category Census Responses Responses
Urban 11.4 22 23.7
Suburban 38.0 37 39.8
Airport 6.8 9 9.7
Highway 39.1 23 24.7
Resort 4.7 2 2.2
Total 100.0 93 100.0
Note: STR = Smith Travel Research; see note 18.
Exhibit 4:
Survey Responses Categorized by Room Count
Percentage Blackout Percentage
of Hotel Survey of Blackout
Number of Rooms Census Responses Responses
Less than 75 57.7 10 10.8
75 to 149 29.9 43 46.2
150 to 299 9.1 28 30.1
300 to 499 2.3 6 6.5
More than 500 1.0 6 6.5
Total 100.0 93 100.0
varied greatly. To enable respondents to
provide descriptions of their experiences
during the event, a Web-based survey was
developed that had fourteen open-ended
questions, as well as “comments” dia-
logue boxes appended to many of the
forty-plus closed-ended questions. This
mixed-question design netted consider-
able detail (more than sixty pages of
single-spaced text data) in the stories,
examples, and insights provided by
respondents.
Respondents were recruited for the
study via an e-mail sent five weeks after
the blackout, with a follow-up e-mail sent
to nonresponders one week later. The e-
mail explained the purpose of the study
and provided a hyperlink to the online sur-
vey and a password for each respondent.
Data analysis used summary statistics,
frequencies, cross-tabulations, and statis-
tical tests of differences between catego-
ries of respondent hotels. In addition,
comment data were content analyzed,
most often by grouping similar comments
into categories to determine the frequency
of certain events, actions, and opinions.
These data were also examined for pat-
terns of responses that indicated shared
meanings and experiences. Finally, com-
ment data were explored for enlightening
examples of the effects of the blackout and
how managers responded to it.
Findings
A hotel’s service-delivery system con-
sists of the physical plant, processes, and
people who provide the hospitality service
to guests, as well as the guests themselves,
who coproduce their experience. Because
these elements form a system, failure of
one element to perform up to standard
affects other elements of the system and
the service experience overall. The black-
out underscored these interrelationships
and how fragile the system is when faced
with the loss of a critical and taken-for-
granted input—in this instance, electrical
power.
Power Problems
Hotel managers reported power outage
durations ranging from 30 minutes to as
long as 52 hours, with an average of 16
hours and a median of 13.5 hours. The
power failure occurred shortly after 4:00
p.m., and the sun set in the blackout region
just before 8:00 p.m. Thus, for half of the
hotels, power was out through the night.
Roughly one-quarter of the hotels were
without power for 24 hours or more, and
10 percent of the hotels had to deal with a
second night without power.
Emergency power. Provisions in the
National Electrical Code (NEC) aim to en-
sure that emergency systems such as eleva-
tors, fire detection and control, and egress
lighting for stairs, hallways, and exit signs
are operable long enough to prevent panic
and facilitate a safe exit.21 The general
standard is that emergency power should
be supplied for a minimum of two hours.
For example, if a hotel uses storage batter-
ies for emergency power, these must be
able to support a full emergency-system
power load for at least ninety minutes
before voltage to the load drops below
87.5 percent. If a generator is used, there
must be at least a two-hour on-site fuel
supply.
The NEC was intended to ensure that
hotels have minimal power for emergency
systems in the event of a fire, flood, or
some other disaster for which life safety is
a concern. The code was not written to
ensure sufficient power for emergency
systems in the event of an extended elec-
trical outage. Thus, hotels that abide by
NEC standards are unlikely to have func-
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tioning emergency systems within a few
hours of a blackout—despite the safety
issues this presents.
Nonfunctioning emergency systems
were a major problem during the blackout.
Nearly half of the hotels (48 percent) did
not have emergency power for the dura-
tion of the outage. Analysis showed a rela-
tionship between the type of emergency-
power system used—battery versus
generator—and whether emergency sys-
tems were functional throughout the
event. Only 16 percent of battery-backup
emergency systems lasted, whereas 85
percent of generator-driven systems
remained powered. Significantly, too,
only half of the hotels had emergency sys-
tems powered by generators. These hotels
were far more likely to be upper-upscale
chain hotels or independents (see Exhibit
5). Analysis also revealed that generator-
backed emergency systems were most
likely to be found in urban hotels and
hotels with more than two hundred rooms.
Standby (auxiliary) power. A distinc-
tion was made in the survey between
emergency backup power and standby or
auxiliary backup power. Whereas emer-
gency power is that needed to keep essen-
tial emergency systems operational, auxil-
iary power runs presumably nonessential
systems, such as guest room lighting and
air-conditioning or heating.22 Only one out
of four hotels had available standby
power. In most cases, when standby power
was available, it was part of an automatic
transfer system that went live almost
immediately after primary power failed.
However, even well-designed auxiliary
systems were far from foolproof. In fact,
in the hotels that had standby power, 24
percent of the systems failed to last for the
duration of the blackout.
Facilities Failures and
Service-Process Challenges
All of the hotels in this study were able
to provide accommodations in guest
rooms, and some even accommodated
guests and nonguests in public areas
within the hotel. One sold-out hotel set up
cots in two meeting rooms, “one for guys
and one for gals,” for people arriving with-
out reservations. Another hotel took in a
high school group that was unable to get
back to its reserved place of lodging, let-
ting the visitors sleep in the restaurant at
no charge. None of the managers reported
having to ask guests to vacate their rooms
20 Cornell Hotel and Restaurant Administration Quarterly FEBRUARY 2005
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Exhibit 5:
Nature of Emergency Power System by Type of Hotel
Generator
STR Scale and Chain Affiliation Battery-Only (or Generator and Battery)
Upper-upscale chain 2 15
Upscale chain 11 9
Midscale with F&B chain 6 6
Midscale without F&B chain 19 3
Economy chain 5 0
Independent 2 15
Total 45 48
Note: STR = Smith Travel Research; see note 18. F&B = food and beverage.
during the blackout. This finding may,
however, reflect nonresponse bias; man-
agers at hotels that did not permit guests in
darkened rooms may have chosen not to
participate in this study. Even allowing for
this possibility, though, the data suggest
that media reports of people being forced
to sleep on the street outside the hotel
likely reflected unusual circumstances
and not the norm.
Although most hoteliers did their best
to make sure there was “room at the inn,”
they often found it difficult to provide
much else. Managers were asked to de-
scribe the extent to which hotel facilities
and systems were affected by the blackout
(not at all, somewhat, very, or completely).
The findings, summarized in Exhibit 6,
reveal just how pervasive the effects of the
blackout were. In the next several sec-
tions, these problems are examined using
managers’ comment data that reveal how
they handled specific problems—or were
unable to do so.
Air-conditioning. Given the power
demands of the typical HVAC system,
the blackout’s severe effect on the air-
conditioning systems is not surprising.
Managers at 85 percent of the hotels
reported a complete shutdown of AC.
According to comment data, lack of AC
was a top source of guest dissatisfaction,
as afternoon temperatures in the region
ranged from the mid–80s to low 90s (Fahr-
enheit). One manager noted that keeping
doors and windows open was a problem
because it was a humid night and there
were mosquitoes out. Another manager
commented, “Due to lack of ventilation,
FEBRUARY 2005 Cornell Hotel and Restaurant Administration Quarterly 21
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Exhibit 6:
Effect of the Blackout on Hotel Facilities and Processes
Note: Numbers represent the percentage of managers responding that the systems in their hotel were
affected. Percentages do not add to 100 because “no response” or “not affected” percentages are not
shown.
the wedding guests in our penthouse
found it very warm.”
Lighting. All but a few managers re-
ported at least some lighting problems,
and 87 percent of them stated that lights
were completely out. One manager said,
“We didn’t have enough emergency light-
ing. Once the batteries drained in our hall-
way lights, the hotel literally went black.”
Insufficient lighting was also a source of
guest dissatisfaction. Another manager
said, “While most [guests] understood
that we could not provide air conditioning
and were thrilled to still have hot water,
they wondered why more lighting was not
on emergency generators.”
The most common management
response to the lack of lighting was to pro-
vide flashlights, if these were available or
obtainable. One hotel had a supply of
penlight key chains with the hotel’s logo
that had been bought for another purpose,
which were given away during the black-
out. Another manager described an ap-
proach to the lighting problem:
Emergency lighting failed within two
hours. All guest rooms were completely
black. I purchased flashlights at a Home
Depot that was open as they had a gener-
ator. I distributed flashlights to all
guests. . . . I called in a security guard for
extra safety as there was such uncer-
tainty with [the length of] time we would
be down. Guests were understanding of
the situation and were surprised that we
distributed flashlights free and then told
them to keep them at check out as a sou-
venir that they survived blackout.
Hotel managers also distributed glow
sticks, battery-operated lanterns, and even
candles. That last option, though, was
used by only a few managers and was a
cause for concern among others due to the
potential fire hazard.
Elevators. Another frequently cited
source of guest dissatisfaction was limited
elevator service, a problem in nine out of
ten hotels. This meant that guests and
employees had to use the stairs, even when
carrying luggage. No emergency situa-
tions were reported as a result of grounded
elevators, though the blackout revealed
the potential for such an eventuality. One
guest was locked in an elevator but was
extricated by the staff “within seconds.”
At another hotel, guests in wheelchairs
lost their access to upper-floor rooms, so
rollaway beds were placed in the cafeteria
for makeshift accommodations. Although
high-rise hotels are usually required to
keep at least one elevator on emergency
power, the failure of these systems at some
hotels meant that those properties were
particularly vulnerable to nonfunctioning
elevators.
Computers. At most hotels, computers
were somewhat affected by the blackout,
and systems at more than half of the hotels
were completely down. However, prop-
erty management systems were either on
some form of uninterruptible power sup-
ply (UPS) or were shadowed by manual
systems. (“Back to the rack sheet and
bucket!” said one manager.) Two-thirds of
the hotels used a system for manual check-
in and checkout. Several managers noted
that the use of manual systems was well
practiced and part of emergency plans, be-
cause the computers often go down.
Manual check-in and checkout often
involved backup reports that were run
when power first failed, but before com-
puters went down, and manual registration
cards to which food and beverage (F&B)
or sundry-item billing was recorded and
placed with guest records in the bucket.
Credit card data were collected using
“old-fashioned” imprint machines, and
bills were tabulated by hand or with calcu-
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lators. Folios were handwritten or sent out
later by mail, fax, or e-mail when power
returned. One manager described using
the hotel-room map indicator to track
available rooms by color-coding rooms
to indicate in-house, vacant and clean,
vacant and dirty, reserved, and out of or-
der. Few managers described problems
with manual processes, and several ex-
pressed pride that things ran smoothly.
Guest room locks. One element of the
check-in process that proved troublesome
for one-quarter of the hotels was guest
room locks. The actual locks, if electronic,
were typically battery operated and not
directly affected by the power failure. The
challenge, instead, was how to make keys.
A manager explained, “If a guest was
checked into the hotel prior to the black-
out, their key worked. However, new
arrivals had to be escorted to their rooms
each time by the bell staff. We were unable
to make new keys because the key ma-
chine is electronic.”
Most hotels that experienced problems
with making keys coped by using emer-
gency master keys. One hotel made fail-
safe keys before the key encoder failed
and then placed a staff member with a key
on each floor by the elevator and stairwell.
One of the more thorough approaches to
dealing with the problem was illustrated
by the following manager’s insight:
One of our contingency plans was to
cut a key for every blocked and vacant
room. The doors work on battery, but the
key cutter is on a battery back-up. We
wanted to make sure we could provide
rooms and sell rooms even if we lost the
key cutter. We also pre-checked-in all
arrivals before we shut the generator off.
A defining feature of this solution was that
potential key-making difficulties were
accounted for in contingency plans,
thereby reducing the actual effect of the
problem when it arose.
Automatic doors. Although hotels rou-
tinely test backup power systems, it is dif-
ficult to test under normal load conditions
for an extended period of time without dis-
rupting guests. As a result, managers and
staff, especially if new to a property,
may be surprised by vulnerabilities in the
service-delivery system during a blackout.
For example, automatic exit doors may
freeze—a problem experienced by more
than half of the hotels. Although these
doors can be operated manually, this
requires someone on site who knows how
to do this quickly to avoid panic or egress
problems.
Communications systems. Although
radios are battery operated, the charger
and the repeater (if used to increase signal
range) require electricity. Thus, a power
failure can black out communication
channels among key hotel departments, a
problem reported by one-third of hotels.
One manager dealt with the loss of two-
way radios by establishing a meeting spot
for hourly reviews. This was supple-
mented by the use of cellular phones as a
substitute for radios. Cellular phones also
were needed when internal telephone sys-
tems failed. Inoperable phone systems
were reported for more than 60 percent of
the hotels—and were another top source
of customer dissatisfaction, according to
managers’ comments. The problem was
not phone service coming into the hotel,
but instead the hotel’s PBX system, which
requires electricity. Although telephones
are often one of the systems on backup
power, when the blackout duration ex-
ceeded the two-hour threshold for power-
ing emergency systems, phones began to
fail.
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Fortunately, guests had alternatives in
addition to cellular phones, including pay-
phones, phone lines that were not part of
the PBX system, and fax lines. Hotel staff
members made their cellular phones avail-
able to guests, and employees coming
on duty were asked to bring in cellular
phones for guest use. This solution was
not ideal, in part because cellular service
was also affected by the blackout in some
areas, including jammed circuits due to
extraordinarily high call volume.
F&B operations. Cooking systems
were very or completely affected at
70 percent of the hotels with F&B
operations—a situation made worse by
nonfunctioning refrigeration systems at
75 percent of hotels with F&B. Even
hotels with gas-fired stoves were affected
because the range hoods needed for vent-
ing cooking exhaust were electrical. Man-
agers were asked to describe the status of
F&B services during the blackout. As
revealed in Exhibit 7, F&B was variously
affected. Bars and restaurants continued
to function at least with limited service.
Room service and banquets were shut
down at more than half of the hotels.
Vending machines were not operational at
more than 60 percent of the hotels, but
nearly half of the hotels had shops open
for sales of snacks and sundries.
Providing F&B was a challenge, but
not an insurmountable one. One hotel fed
about 1,000 people even though it did not
have utilities. Another put together a wed-
ding for 150 people in less than twenty-
four hours. A third hotel fed 300 people by
candlelight. Whether F&B was shuttered
or operating was as much a function of
managerial judgment as it was of which
appliances worked. Hotel managers were
creative in how they delivered F&B. This
was driven by the fortunate convergence
of necessity (with spoilage imminent,
managers had to either use it or lose it) and
the needs of guests who had little other
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Exhibit 7:
Effect of the Blackout on F&B Systems
Note: Numbers on the Y axis represent the percentage of managers responding that a specific food and
beverage (F&B) service was affected completely, partially, or not at all.
option than to rely on the hospitality pro-
vided by their hoteliers. Rather than let
food go to waste, managers gave it away,
setting up complimentary continental
breakfasts and cold buffets for lunch and
dinner. Despite the inability to use kitch-
ens, roughly one-third of the hotels with
F&B managed to serve a hot evening
meal, typically by ordering out or heat-
ing up the grill. Pizza was a common food
purchased for guests. Explained one
manager,
We provided pizza for all as the store
next door has gas ovens. So we ordered
80 pizzas for guests to share. . . . We
made 150 sandwiches by hand using on-
hand items in refrigerators. . . . We pro-
vided comp food for [the] entire 24
hours. . . . We allowed them to use [the]
entire mini bar in [the room] for free as
well.
Some managers opened vending ma-
chines and gave away snacks and soft
drinks. To keep food and drinks cold with-
out functioning refrigerators, ice ma-
chines were used for storage.
Although hotels generally managed to
provide at least limited food service
and, in some cases, gave guests a delight-
ful F&B experience, the data reveal
another side to the story: only 15 percent
of hotels had fully operational restaurants,
only 8 percent offered full room service,
and only 22 percent ran banquet functions.
Though giving away food no doubt
pleased guests, this also meant giving
away F&B dollars. Had the blackout
lasted longer than it did, the inability to
store or prepare food could have produced
serious negative consequences for guests.
Water supply. One unpleasant surprise
for many hotels was the disruption in the
supply of water. For nearly three out of
four hotels, this meant hot water was at
least somewhat affected, with almost 39
percent of the hotels completely losing hot
water. At worst, this meant no running
water at all. The supply of potable water
was at least somewhat affected by the
blackout at almost half of the hotels, with
17 percent of the hotels without any run-
ning water. For two out of three hotels,
bathroom facilities were at least some-
what affected, with 22 percent being
nonfunctional.
The consequences of the water supply
problem were often disagreeable for
guests and employees. In addition to cold
showers and rationed water for drinking,
brushing teeth, and the like, toilets had to
be flushed manually at many facilities.
One manager instructed guests to use only
toilets in public bathrooms, which were
flushed with water from the fire hose. A
more common source of water for manual
flushing was the hotel’s swimming pool.
Said one manager,
Due to one flush only and no water at all
after that, the [maintenance] department
and I used the water from the swim-
ming pool five gallons at a time, going
door to door and manually pouring the
water in the toilet to flush away the
waste materials (for this we coined the
term “super-flushes”).
Interestingly, one manager suggested that
manual flushing of toilets was a source of
guest satisfaction during the blackout;
another manager said guests felt just the
opposite.
For many hotels, the lack of running
water was a greater problem than the lack
of electricity. Fortunately, most hotels had
a supply of bottled water on hand or were
able to obtain a supply to satisfy drinking
needs, at least for a day. However, manag-
ers noted that they plan to increase their
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supply of bottled water, and a few manag-
ers said they plan to tie water pumps into
the standby power system. One manager
who ran a temporary power line to the
water pump was able to keep water flow-
ing to guest bathrooms, even if it was only
cold water.
Planning, Preparation,
and Emergency Management
Hotel managers were asked about the
level of service quality during the black-
out and the degree to which they were pre-
pared to deal with service demands. Most
managers believed that their hotels ex-
ceeded typical service levels. However,
when asked whether they agreed with the
statement, “We were prepared to deal with
service demands during the blackout,”
only 20 percent of managers agreed that
their hotels were prepared. Managers
were significantly more likely to say they
were prepared for service demands if their
hotel had standby power than if it did not.23
Emergency planning and decision
making. To examine how prepared hotels
were, managers were asked about emer-
gency plans and the nature of their deci-
sion making during the blackout. Nearly
all hotels had a sufficient supply of beds,
pillows, and blankets. Bottled water was
less plentiful, with some hotels running
out. A lack of lighting was a bigger prob-
lem and source of guest dissatisfaction.
One out of three hotels did not have
enough flashlights and batteries, and more
than half of hotels did not have enough
glow sticks. Managers who did have a sup-
ply of these items, especially enough for
all guestrooms, described how this level of
readiness was beyond guests’ expecta-
tions. Ensuring a better supply of sub-
stitute lighting topped the list of things
managers would have done differently to
prepare for the blackout.
The issue of contingency planning was
addressed by asking managers whether
their hotels have written plans, whether
plans were followed, and if not, why this
was so. One out of five managers said that
their hotels did not have formal plans or
they were not sure whether such plans
existed. Of those managers who said that
their hotels have emergency plans, nearly
two out of three said they still made most
decisions during the blackout based on
judgment, as opposed to the plans. In fact,
10 percent of these managers did not use
the plans at all. As shown in Exhibit 8,
emergency plans had less influence on
decision making than did concerns about
hotel image.
Managers who did not use emergency
plans during the blackout were asked why.
Most responses suggested that existing
plans did not apply to an extended power
failure and instead cover what to do with
equipment in the event of fire, bomb
threats, floods, or evacuations. Other man-
agers noted that they have procedures for
temporary power failures, but not for a
blackout of such duration and geographic
scope. One manager commented, “Was it
really an emergency? . . . We followed pro-
cedures as they pertained to the basics
[and] after that we winged it.”
This need to “wing it” and improvise as
conditions changed was common. Manag-
ers referred to the lack of running water or
the loss of F&B as unexpected. One man-
ager said, “We followed all emergency
plans, but there were circumstances not
anticipated in the plan [that demanded]
more in-the-moment guest-satisfaction
decisions.” Another manager explained,
Emergency plans are a roadmap, but
at times [there] are detours necessary.
As an example, when the elevators’
switches were heating, we took a porta-
ble A/C unit to the control room and
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connected it to the emergency power to
cool the switches down to a safe operat-
ing temperature and restored service.
Summing up were these comments from
two respondents: “I had to adapt to every
guest situation and complaint. We did not
have a manual to do this”; and “We found
when we needed to follow [the plans],
they were of little help in the actual situa-
tion. We have since changed them.”
Although some hotel managers sug-
gested that the nature of the blackout pre-
cluded the event from coverage by emer-
gency plans, others (a relative minority,
however) saw the need to reexamine the
emergency-management process and to
develop procedures for handling longer-
duration power outages (see Exhibit 9).
This planning review and revision was
complemented by actions taken to re-
balance the generator load to include sys-
tems such as some air-conditioning
or heating capability, telephones, and
kitchen cooking units. The blackout also
encouraged managers of some hotels to
address deficiencies in backup power
capacity by pricing or buying new genera-
tor sets and servicing existing generators
or increasing capacity.
Despite these initiatives for better
emergency management, the most com-
mon change to emergency plans was no
change at all. In fact, 40 percent of the
managers who responded to this question
said that nothing had been done, and only
a few of these managers said this was be-
cause existing plans worked well during
the blackout. Furthermore, those manag-
ers whose hotels were not affected by the
blackout were almost twice as likely to say
they had made no changes to emergency
plans following the event as those manag-
ers whose hotels were affected. This was
the case even though there were no signifi-
cant differences in the perceptions of man-
agers in the two groups of the likelihood of
an emergency event similar to the black-
out happening again in the next twelve
months. As shown in Exhibit 10, on aver-
age, managers believe that there is just less
than an even chance of another blackout-
type event in the near future.
The benefits of backup power. Hotels
with a generator should fare better in
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Exhibit 8:
Factors Influencing Managers’ Decisions during the Blackout
Factor Influence Score
Guest safety 4.86
Employee safety 4.67
Guest comfort 4.51
Guest satisfaction 4.39
Liability 4.24
Hotel image 4.11
Emergency plans 3.68
Hotel profits 2.73
Occupancy 2.71
Superiors or corporate owners 2.57
Media coverage 2.06
Note: Influence score is based on a scale of 1 = no influence to 5 = a great deal of influence.
maintaining services than will hotels with
no more than battery backup. Empirical
support for this proposition is important,
though, for investment in standby power
can range from a few thousand dollars for
a portable generator to power a few critical
systems to millions of dollars for a perma-
nent generator capable of running a large
hotel seamlessly. To assess which facili-
ties failures were mitigated by standby
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Exhibit 9:
Changes Made to Hotels’ Emergency Plans since the Blackout
• No changes (27.6%)
• Stocked up on flashlights, batteries, glowsticks, lanterns, etc. (21.1%)
• Checked and rebalanced systems on backup generator power (e.g., adding AC,
computers, cooking hoods, high-speed Internet access, telephones, voice mail,
and water pumps) (13.8%)
• Reviewed, updated, enhanced, or developed emergency plans (12.5%)
• Addressed backup power supply by increasing existing generator capacity,
buying new generators or pricing them, or servicing generators (7.9%)
• Trained management, key staff, and new hires on emergency procedures or
manual hotel systems, including conducting drills (6.6%)
• Purchased a supply of emergency items (e.g., bottled water, medical kit) and
created a location for this blackout box (5.9%)
• Miscellaneous: made more emergency room keys, increased water supply,
developed better reports for front desk (4.6%)
Note: Changes are listed in descending order based on the number of times each item was mentioned by
managers in response to the question, “Since the blackout, what changes have been made to your hotel’s
emergency plans?” Percentages associated with these data do not compare to the overall response data,
because they are based on the total number of comments, in which some managers offered multiple
comments.
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Hotel Manager Expectations for Another Blackout
Note: Numbers on the Y axis represent the percentage of managers responding to a question about the
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power, data were cross-tabulated by the
presence or absence of standby power at
the hotel and the impact of the blackout on
facilities and processes. As detailed in
Exhibit 11, there is a significant relation-
ship between a hotel’s having standby
power and mitigated effects of the black-
out on air-conditioning, computers, eleva-
tors, emergency lighting, guest room
lighting, hot water, refrigeration systems,
and telephones. There is no relationship
between standby power and the effects of
the blackout on automatic doors, bath-
rooms, cooking systems, guest room
locks, potable water, and two-way radios.
The latter finding shows where operations
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Exhibit 11:
Relationship between Standby Power and Operation of Hotel Facilities
Percentage of Hotels
Reporting System Status . . .
Backup Not at All Very or
Power or Somewhat Completely Significant
Available Affected Affected Relationship
Air-conditioning No 1.5 98.5 Yes
Yes 20.0 80.0 (p < .001)
Automatic doors No 35.7 64.3 No
Yes 50.0 50.0 (p = .280)
Bathrooms No 62.7 37.3 No
Yes 76.0 24.0 (p = .229)
Computers No 17.9 82.1 Yes
Yes 56.0 44.0 (p < .001)
Cooking systems No 27.7 72.3 No
Yes 33.3 66.7 (p = .620)
Elevators No 19.6 80.4 Yes
Yes 68.0 32.0 (p < .001)
Emergency lights No 56.7 43.3 Yes
Yes 100.0 0.0 (p < .001)
Guest room lights No 3.0 97.0 Yes
Yes 16.0 84.0 (p < .05)
Guest room locks No 89.6 10.4 No
Yes 92.0 8.0 (p = .725)
Hot water No 38.8 61.2 Yes
Yes 64.0 36.0 (p < .05)
Potable water No 71.6 28.4 No
Yes 84.0 16.0 (p = .223)
Refrigeration No 17.7 82.3 Marginal
Yes 36.0 64.0 (p < .10)
Telephones No 22.4 77.6 Yes
Yes 80.0 20.0 (p < .001)
Two-way radios No 79.2 20.8 No
Yes 87.0 13.0 (p = .426)
Note: Data are from the ninety-three hotels that lost power in the blackout. Significant differences are
noted for systems where having backup power made the difference between operation and failure.
were vulnerable and suggests that these
systems should be evaluated for addition
to the standby power load.
Managers’ comments underscored the
importance of standby power. One manager
said that success in dealing with the black-
out was partly due to keeping the hotel’s
generator running for twenty-three hours.
Another manager stated, “Our hotel is
four years old; [the blackout] was the first
major event we had as a hotel in the
area. . . . Guests were impressed with the
fact we had a generator with 100-percent
capacity.” Another telling remark is
offered by this respondent:
We missed the blackout, but we lost
power for 10 hours during hurricane
Isabel. Fortunately, our generators and
backup systems allowed us to operate
during a nearly sold-out night, without a
dime of revenue lost. Although we do
not provide backup power for every
guest room, other than lighting, nearly
all the guests complimented us on the
ability to run the public and food-service
areas.
Despite these benefits, it is notable that
few managers planned to buy a generator,
increase capacity, or evaluate their hotel’s
generator capacity for reallocating power
to different functions.
Service Recovery
and Guest Satisfaction
Managers were asked how satisfied
they thought guests were with their hotel
stay during the blackout. Few respondents
thought guests were dissatisfied. In con-
trast, 95 percent of the managers believed
guests were at least “somewhat satisfied,”
and three out of four managers said that
guests were “very satisfied.” Managers
based customer-satisfaction assessments
on informal guest feedback (73 percent)
or guest letters and comment cards (61
percent). Far fewer managers (15 per-
cent) said satisfaction data collected by a
third party was a source of their guest-
satisfaction judgment.
Managers described aspects of the
hotel or its service that were most satisfy-
ing to guests or, in a separate question,
most dissatisfying. The results of a con-
tent analysis of these data are presented in
Exhibit 12. Several patterns are evident.
First, sources of dissatisfaction almost
entirely involved facilities or process
problems. In contrast, sources of satisfac-
tion were primarily described in terms of
the service behavior of management and
staff. Except for isolated complaints, per-
sonal service is not even mentioned by
managers as a source of dissatisfaction.
Considering the problems with service
reliability and tangibles reported earlier,
managers may have overestimated guests’
tolerance. The following comment is
revealing: “Guests were complimentary
[as] to how we handled things but still
complained a lot about basic amenities
that were missing.” Another manager
noted, “Guests expected that we would
have a generator that would keep our
power running just as if nothing was going
on in the world. I explained even with a
generator we would only power emer-
gency systems. They felt otherwise.” Con-
cluded this respondent, “A lot of the guests
did expect us to have a generator for back-
up, but we do not. We explained we have
never felt the need to have a generator
because we are only two levels—but we
may consider getting one now.”24 Though
managers may have overestimated guest
tolerance, another explanation is that, on
average, guests were satisfied with their
hotel stays during the blackout because
their expectations for the experience were
lower than normal.
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Most hotel managers believed that low-
ered expectations were common among
guests during the blackout (see Exhibit
13). Lowered guest expectations may
have reduced the service-quality bar such
that service that would normally be un-
acceptable (e.g., no hot food or room
service—only a cold food buffet) became
adequate, and otherwise simple acts of
service recovery and personal attention
(e.g., room escorts and distribution of sou-
venir flashlights) became exceptional.
One manager observed,
When guests are traveling during a time
of a blackout or even during a storm that
takes out power, the inconvenience of
[the] power outage is slim when needing
a place to stay for warmth and safety.
Guests were so understanding when we
experienced the power outage for eight
hours.
Another manager offered a more specific
explanation:
Expectations were flexible—guests
expected accommodations, but under-
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Exhibit 12:
Managers’ Perceptions of the Sources of Guest Satisfaction and Dissatisfaction
during the Blackout
Sources of Dissatisfaction Sources of Satisfaction
Air-conditioning (11)
Backup power out or limited (11)
Lights or substitute lighting, e.g., flash-
lights out or limited (11)
Elevators—loss of full use (9)
Water—lack of for drinking or bathing (9)
Telephones out (6)
Television out (4)
Bathroom conditions (3)
Food—lack of (3)
Internet connections out (2)
Bar not open; news updates too infre-
quent; reservations confused; room
rates under the circumstances; sched-
ules disrupted; voice mail out (1 each)
Nothing (11)
No response (10)
Service—personal, caring attention (22)
Service—staff professionalism: attitude,
helpfulness, friendliness, accommodat-
ing nature, accessibility, understanding,
willingness (17)
Food and beverages—availability (16)
Management of the situation—managers
present; preparedness of the hotel;
business as usual; minimal service
interruption (16)
Service—general customer service,
responsiveness, and anticipating and
meeting needs (15)
Information updates and communication
(10)
Reassurance—safety and security needs
met (10)
Food and beverages—complimentary (7)
Flashlights (3)
Elevators worked (2)
Backup power for duration; bar open;
bathrooms—manual flushes; emer-
gency lighting worked, ice machines;
room rates reduced; transportation—
airport pickup (1 each)
Nothing (0)
No response (2)
Note: Figures represent the number of times each item was mentioned by a manager in response to the
question, “What aspects of your hotel or service delivery were guests most dissatisfied with during the
blackout?”
stood air conditioning and lighting were
not operational. They expected to be fed,
but were amenable to a limited menu.
Guest expectations regarding communi-
cation to them was high.
The last point highlights the need for
up-to-the-minute news during a crisis and
frequent communication of news to
guests. Flow of information can help man-
agers to shape guests’ expectations in the
early stages of emergency events and per-
ceptions of service delivery and satisfac-
tion evaluations later. Moreover, informa-
tion flow from hotel management to
guests can dispel rumor and quell panic. A
few managers noted that some guests
feared a terrorist attack when power first
failed. The importance of managing
expectations is revealed in the comments
of one respondent who stated, “For the
most part, guests understood the large
effect [of the blackout] on our part of the
country; however, some, especially at the
beginning of the loss of power, were very
demanding, almost violent.”
Guest expectations likely were, on
average, reduced, with many guests be-
coming quite accommodating and for-
giving. Service-recovery efforts of hotel
management and staff surely mitigated
many sources of guest dissatisfaction. Not
all guests were flexible in their expecta-
tions and demands, though, which sug-
gests that guests’ tolerance should not be
taken for granted even in extraordinary
circumstances. Some requests may stretch
the bounds of what hoteliers can be rea-
sonably expected to provide. (Exclaimed
one manager, “Guests wanted us to supply
them with gas for their cars!?”) Still, it is
reasonable for guests to expect hoteliers to
at least try to find solutions. In summary,
guest expectations become a moving tar-
get during emergencies, and not all expec-
tations will be diminished.
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Exhibit 13:
Managers’ Perceptions of Guests’ Expectations during the Blackout
Note: Expectations during the blackout are in comparison to expectations during normal operations.
Service Failure and Recovery:
The Bottom Line
The blackout had an impact not only on
hotels’ service quality but also on the bot-
tom line. When power failed, some hotels
gave away rooms, some gave away F&B,
and some gave away nothing at all. Even
those hotels that minimized costs, how-
ever, lost revenue as F&B operations were
shuttered, meetings were canceled, and
guest rooms went unoccupied. In con-
trast, other hotels saw an increase in occu-
pancy and revenue per available room
(RevPAR). The question examined in this
section is, what was the net effect of the
blackout on the bottom line?
Managers were asked to estimate what
impact the blackout had on a set of stan-
dard performance measures for the month
of August 2003. Respondents were asked
only whether the blackout had a positive
effect (e.g., increase in average daily rate
[ADR]), negative effect (e.g., decrease in
ADR), or no effect. Answers from all 147
managers who responded to the survey
were used, with analysis focusing on dif-
ferences between those hotels that lost
power and those hotels that had power.
Occupancy. Managers at just more than
half of the hotels estimated that the black-
out had no effect on occupancy (see
Exhibit 14). One out of six hotels saw an
increase in occupancy, whereas one out of
four hotels saw a decrease. This occu-
pancy swing differed significantly,
though, depending upon whether the hotel
lost power. Nearly 30 percent of hotels
with power saw an occupancy increase,
and only 13 percent saw a decrease. In
contrast, only 9 percent of hotels that
lost power saw an occupancy increase,
whereas 36 percent saw a decrease (a dif-
ference significant at p < .001). On aver-
age, then, the blackout had a negative
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Exhibit 14:
Effects of the Blackout on
Operating Ratios
Note: Graphs show the percentage of responses
based on an N of 147, including both hotels that
lost power and those that did not. RevPAR = reve-
nue per available room; ADR = average daily rate.
effect on occupancy for those hotels that
lost power.
ADR. Similar results were found for the
blackout’s effects on hotels’ average daily
rate. Managers at nearly four out of five
hotels in the full sample reported no ADR
change. Fewer than 5 percent of hotels
reported positive effects on ADR due to
the blackout (9 percent of hotels with pri-
mary power versus 2 percent of hotels
without). However, 17 percent of hotels
reported a decrease in ADR due to the
blackout, with the decrease more often
reported for hotels without power (25 per-
cent) versus those with power (4 percent),
a difference that is statistically significant
(p < .001).
Managers at hotels that lost power were
asked to describe their pricing approach.
The majority of the respondents (62 per-
cent) reported that rate policies were unal-
tered. If a discount was given, it was most
often offered only if the guest asked for
compensation (31 percent of respon-
dents). The remaining managers (6 per-
cent) stated that they offered a uniform
discount, but not a full refund, to all
guests. Of the hotels offering discounts,
the range of discounts given was 10 to 100
percent off the originally quoted rate, with
a mean discount of 35 percent. When the
hotels that lost power but did not offer a
discount are added to the set, the mean dis-
count across the ninety-three hotels is 13.7
percent. This finding helps to explain the
greater decrease in ADR reported for
hotels that lost power versus those that did
not. It is important to consider, too, that
most hotels without power offered some
form of compensation instead of or in
addition to rate discounts (e.g., reduced-
price or free meals, free alcoholic bever-
ages, or vouchers for free room nights). In
general, then, these findings show that the
blackout had a negative effect on ADR for
those hotels that were without power.
RevPAR. As with findings for occu-
pancy and ADR, there were significant
differences in managers’ estimated effects
of the blackout on RevPAR, depending on
whether the hotel did or did not have
power. Overall, 63 percent of managers
estimated that RevPAR for the month of
August 2003 was unaffected by the black-
out. One out of nine managers estimated a
positive impact on RevPAR due to the
blackout; however, most of these manag-
ers were from hotels that did not lose
power. Only 3 percent of the managers
who experienced power failure estimated
a positive effect of the event on RevPAR,
versus 24 percent of managers from unaf-
fected hotels. In contrast, one out of four
managers overall said the impact of the
blackout was a RevPAR decrease. Manag-
ers at 37 percent of the hotels that lost
power estimated a negative effect of the
event on RevPAR, versus only 7 percent of
managers at hotels that did not lose power
(a difference significant at p < .001).
Profit and loss (P&L). Managers also
estimated the impact of the blackout on
total profit or loss from rooms, F&B, and
other sources. Overall, 56 percent of man-
agers estimated no impact of the blackout
on P&L. Managers in hotels that did not
lose power estimated that the profit impact
was negligible (17 percent saw a profit,
and 13 percent saw a loss); managers in
hotels that lost power estimated that they
fared worse on average, with 44 percent
estimating a loss due to the blackout ver-
sus 9 percent estimating a profit, a signifi-
cant difference (p < .001).
Those managers who said that the
blackout produced a profit or loss were
asked to give a dollar estimate. Results are
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reported in Exhibit 15. Hotels that lost pri-
mary power also lost money on average—
an estimated $4,837. In contrast, hotels that
did not lose power showed a small esti-
mated average profit of $623. This differ-
ence was statistically significant (p < .01).
In sum, these findings show that the black-
out had a negative effect on the bottom-
line P&L of those hotels that lost primary
power during the event.
Backup power and the bottom line.
Given the potentially large investment re-
quired for a standby power system, an
important question is whether those hotels
with standby systems fared better across
the standard performance measures than
those hotels without backup power. Re-
gression analysis revealed that standby
power was not a significant predictor of
changes in occupancy, ADR, RevPAR, or
P&L attributable to the blackout. This
finding is not altogether surprising, given
that standby systems failed to last for the
duration of the blackout at one out of four
hotels that had backup generators. This
finding could also be due to noise in the
data. Comment data certainly show that
many managers were less concerned
about the bottom line than they were about
guest and employee comfort and safety.
Nevertheless, this finding does not sup-
port the expectation that standby power
systems can significantly mitigate finan-
cial losses in the event of a large-scale
power failure. However, the following
observation from a study participant sug-
gests that the return on quality offered by
investment in backup power generation
demands further research:
This is a limited-service facility, and we
were able to provide emergency housing
for those affected. This happens often
during storms, etc. My recommendation
to the owner is to install a system that
will keep us running even in the event of
a widespread blackout, enabling us to
offer a place of safety. We are two hours
from the nearest affected area and
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Exhibit 15:
Effect of the Blackout on Hotel Profit or Loss
Number Minimum Maximum
Reporting Amount Amount Standard
Profit or Loss Reported Reported Mean Deviation
Hotels that did not lose power
Profit 9 1,000 23,000 6,000 6,980
Loss 6 1,000 –5,000 –3,500 1,760
Total 53 623 3,879
Hotels that did lose power
Profit 8 1,000 15,000 6,500 5,980
Loss 36 –1,000 –70,000 –13,810 16,610
Total 92 –4,837 12,818
Note: Inspection of boxplots of the data and standard deviation estimates revealed the influence of outliers, in partic-
ular the estimated loss of $100,000 by a manager whose hotel did not lose power and an estimated loss of $200,000
by a manager whose hotel did lose power. Although these estimates are feasible, given the size of the hotels (500 and
860 rooms, respectively), and if losses attributable to food and beverage (F&B) and meetings business are factored
into the estimate, these two hotels were dropped from the profit and loss (P&L) analysis. “Total” figures include
respondents who estimated no profit or loss.
picked up many room-nights during the
emergency.
Discussion
While it may seem that the blackout of
’03 was a one-time event, the past few
years have repeatedly shown that uncon-
trollable disruptions of this type are com-
mon. When compared with the devastat-
ing effects of the hurricane season of 2004
or the terrorism of 2001, the blackout was
relatively benign. Indeed, when electrical
power first went down across northeastern
North America on August 14, 2003, hotel
managers had little about which to be
concerned. It was still daylight, and the
weather was warm. Emergency backup
power could be expected to support essen-
tial systems, at least for a few hours. Staff
and customers could make do.
However, the blackout took an unex-
pected course. When night fell, most
hotels still were without power, and at
least half had no power through daybreak.
More troubling, as the duration of the
blackout wore on, power needed for emer-
gency systems began to fail. Despite these
challenges, hotels coped, thanks largely to
the service-recovery efforts of employees.
If judged on the ability to provide lodg-
ing and some type of sustenance, then
hotels performed well during the black-
out. However, if judged on the total ser-
vice offering, a different picture emerges.
Hotel facilities and service processes were
widely compromised, and the guest expe-
rience was sometimes poor and unpleas-
ant. Guests were often without the essen-
tials (e.g., lights and hot water), let alone
amenities that they have come to expect
(e.g., Internet access and in-room mov-
ies). The physical plant is the founda-
tion on which the service-delivery sys-
tem is built. When this foundation falters,
two key dimensions of service quality in
the hospitality context—reliability and
tangibility—suffer, and the gap widens
between perceived service and the ex-
pected service. Beyond the matter of
guests’ comfort and convenience was the
issue of safety. The shutdown of emer-
gency systems after only a few hours left
darkened stairways and public areas,
silent phones, and inoperable elevators.
This suggests that powering to minimum
standards outlined in electrical codes may
not be enough to support another key
dimension of service quality: assurance.
In general, having backup power im-
proved hotel operations and promoted
guest safety. Many guests expected hotels
to have backup power for emergency
lights at the very least, and some guests
expected hotels to have standby power for
all services. Whether there might be a pos-
itive return on investment in standby
power, though, is an important question. A
fundamental premise of return on quality
is that quality improvements have a cost,
and not all improvements will yield bene-
fits that make the investment worth it.25
Thus, it may be worth it to buy flashlights
for every guest room in the event of a
power failure, but it may not be worth it to
retrofit a hotel with a backup generator
capable of carrying the entire operational
load. Data showing that having a standby
power generator significantly protected
the bottom line are not found in this study.
Thus, it is not possible to rule out that it
really made no bottom-line difference
whether a hotel had backup power.
Hotels were fortunate that the blackout
occurred in August and not in January. Al-
though nonfunctioning air-conditioning
was a source of guest and employee dis-
comfort, the failed HVAC situation could
have been far worse in the winter. This is
just one way in which the blackout offered
considerable potential learning value for
managers. Some hotels have since im-
proved emergency plans, but the most
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common planning action reported by
managers was to do nothing at all. The
causes for this inaction vary, though the
findings point to managers’ believing that
such an event could not be planned for and
instead required managerial judgment as
contingencies emerged. That attitude is
unsettling when one considers that some
hotels had no emergency plans—or man-
agers were unsure whether such plans
even existed. Although the blackout was
unusual and its scope was relatively exten-
sive, the effects of a power outage of this
type can be foreseen and responses can be
prepared, even if it is not possible to antic-
ipate every contingency or guest request.
Reliability and assurance in lodging hinge
on the ability to predict and protect against
factors that introduce instability in the
service-delivery system.
Managers believed that the guest expe-
rience during the blackout was at least tol-
erable and that guests were satisfied with
their stay. Most managers based their
assessment of guest satisfaction on infor-
mal feedback. The data collected for this
study are likewise limited in that they
examine the blackout experience from the
manager’s perspective, so one can only
infer how guests truly felt. However, when
framed by the literature on service quality,
an analysis of managers’ descriptions of
service failure and recovery suggests that,
on average, they overweighted the effects
of good customer service and under-
weighted the negative effects of facilities
problems.
The ultimate arbiter of service quality
is the customer. Knowing what customers
expect even during extraordinary situa-
tions is important, because delivering any-
thing less can lead to dissatisfaction, lost
customers, and negative word of mouth.
Because guest expectations were lower
and guests were tolerant, hotels could
delight customers simply by providing
basic amenities and functioning with few
service disruptions. The hotel that was
able to leave the lights on—as well as the
air-conditioning—was in the enviable
position of creating a customer experience
that was unexpected under the circum-
stances. In a companion piece in this issue,
I have compiled a list of recommendations
that are intended to help hospitality man-
agers safeguard service when the unex-
pected happens.
Conclusion
Delivering quality service when the un-
expected happens requires more than just
the extraordinary efforts of personnel to
recover when service fails. Service excel-
lence is a system. The physical plant, ser-
vice processes, and formal plans are the
foundation of the system—the structure
that must be solidly in place to enable
employees to do their jobs well and guests
to coproduce their experience. Unfortu-
nately, the foundation is often overlooked
until some event reveals a crack. The hos-
pitality industry has confronted a number
of these events in recent years, with each
being hailed as a “wake-up call”; yet based
on the findings presented in this study, few
lessons are being learned. We continue to
take for granted the safety of our sur-
roundings, the reliability of our systems,
and the ability of our employees to make
up the difference.
This study reveals that there is a gap
between what we “have to do” as reflected
in code requirements for guest safety dur-
ing an emergency and what we “should
do,” which is less formally reflected in
customer requirements for comfort, con-
venience, and reassurance. Given travel-
ers’increasing anxiety and concerns about
safety away from home, hospitality lead-
ers bear a social responsibility to do more
to safeguard service. At the least, those
hotels that can position themselves based
FEBRUARY 2005 Cornell Hotel and Restaurant Administration Quarterly 37
SAFEGUARDING HOSPITALITY SERVICE DISASTER
on service quality even when the unex-
pected happens can build a competitive
advantage. Summarizing these ideas are
the following thoughts from a respondent
to this study:
I found it interesting that many local
people looked at this hotel as an oasis.
Some people honestly did not under-
stand why we had no power. Some came
in asking what they should do. I guess
the interesting part to me was that these
individuals did not go to their neigh-
bors or relatives—they came to the
hotel. I will take it as a compliment that
we are so highly considered during an
emergency.
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